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Event Management E-pub 2012). Cabral & Silva (2013) extended this to include the use of ancillary facilities, which they emphasised to incorporate museums and convention centres located nearby stadiums. Preuss (2009) argues it is often these ancillary facilities which form a positive legacy, although the future operational costs are largely underestimated (Mills & Rosentraub, 2013) .
Substantial budgets and resources are needed to develop the appropriate sporting, transport and ancillary infrastructure which commonly leads to a reliance on public expenditure and subsidies from taxpayers (Gratton & Preuss, 2008; Mills & Rosentraub, 2013; Preuss & Schnitzer, 2015) . These funds can be diverted from social and environmental programmes to the development of sporting infrastructure (Cabral & Silva, 2013; Jones, 2001; Li, 2013; Preuss, 2009 ). In turn, most large-scale facility and venue constructions are justified on the basis of their prospective benefit to the economy and local participation levels post-event (Gaffney, 2015) . Searle (2002) noted that this relocation of spending and resources could have negative impacts on urban development in other areas of the city or region. Hence, understanding locals' perceptions in pre-event periods, engaging the host community in the decision making processes, and securing locals' MSE support are seen as critical success attributes (Michopoulou & Giuliano, 2018; Pappas, 2018; Ritchie, 2000) . For example, in response to accusations of facilities becoming 'white elephants' after the event, where the stadia are underused, some structures are designed to be dismantled after the event or reduced in capacity (Gratton & Preuss, 2008; Li, 2013; Müller, 2012; Thornley, 2002) .
Towards Theorising the Importance of Pre-event Evaluation for Legacy
In the MSE lifecycle -bidding, planning and preparation, event delivery and post-event wrap up and handover (Hiller, 1998; Kirby, Duignan & McGillivray, 2018) , legacy is broadly accepted as occurring in the post-event stage and incorporates the events context, temporal Copyright © Cognizant Communication Corporation 6 MS 19 030 Event Management E-pub nature of planning and positive and negative aspects that form in the hosting region (Preuss, 2007 (Preuss, , 2015 ; Thomson et al., 2013) . The above studies, like most examinations on legacies, predominantly focus on the immediate post-event outcomes. Coakley and Souza (2013) suggest rather than measuring the legacy outcomes at the post-event stage, there is room to evaluate the processes in the pre-event stage and identify the factors which may detract favourable legacy outputs. To understand how legacies are formed, it is important to recognise the actors who have power to influence the development of legacy plans. In his evaluation of Brazil, India and South Africa, Maharaj (2015) found the public had little or no consultation as costs escalated and the poorest became increasingly adversely constrained by the MSEs. He recognised the relationship between the private and public sector controlling the flow of capital and direction of activities during the planning and construction phases. On the other hand, Nunkoo, Ribeiro, Sunnassee and Gursoy (2018) developed a theoretical framework associated with public trust in institutions organising mega sporting events. They posit corruption, transparency and knowledge as influential dimensions upon the levels of public trust and retaining or restoring this trust requires multiple stakeholder engagement and political will. Furthermore, the authors establish that public trust should form an integral part of any future bid package, but to date, organisers have failed to appreciate such elements. Other researchers such as Henne (2015) argue that little is known about the consequences of transparency and corruption linked to MSEs, and empirical infrastructure analysis is scant within MSE studies (Li, 2013) . Therefore, we address this gap by analysing the impact of pre-event organisation on the legacy of two events. Specifically, we focus on two host territories Cuiabá (Brazil 2014 FIFA World Cup) and Porto Maravilha, Rio de Janeiro (Rio 2016 Olympic Games). (Cowie, 2018) . This is set against the backdrop of over 1 million people taking to the streets in 2013 to protest against hosting the 2014 World Cup (Watts, 2013) . In Rio, there were similar anti Olympic Games street marches and protests. Ultimately, the public was voicing their concerns on public spending for event infrastructure (e.g. stadiums) when health and education needed to take priority. Although a country at peace, Brazil's internal politics and social divisions are stark (Korstanje, Tzanelli & Clayton, 2014) , therefore offering a contested terrain in which politics played a significant role in the planning, running and evaluation of the two MSEs.
Brazilian Political and Policy Environment
In recent times, comparable to the internal political implosion in Brazil, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) and Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), has come under increased scrutiny over costly host outlays and the lack of transparency in how these 'regimes' award bidding contracts to host cities. In particular, FIFA have struggled to cope with corruption scandals, facing a public backlash and garnering attention from the press which has ensured that their problematic reputation remains a continual issue (Horne & Silvestre, 2016) .
Both the IOC and FIFA have tried to counter-act these claims by aligning themselves with the global discourse on sustainable development, declaring their flagship events are socially and environmentally beneficial (Hayes & Karamichas, 2012) .
The politics within the government and arrangements with international organising bodies were fundamental to the special political circumstances which the paper discusses. This 
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METHOD
The study is informed by empirical data collected by the two researchers from the most recent mega sporting events held in Brazil -the 2014 FIFA World Cup and Rio 2016 Olympic Games. We present case studies of the two cities, Cuiabá (World Cup) and Porto Maravilha, Rio de Janeiro (Olympic Games) to illustrate contextual similarities and differences in a bounded time-scale, determined by the wider socio-economic circumstances (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill, 2009 According to Yin (2018) , there are four testing criteria for judging the quality of case study research design. These include construct validity, internal validity, external validity and reliability. These tests for quality were applied throughout the collection of primary and secondary sources and triangulation was used to ensure the validity of sources. Validity in the primary data collection was maintained through the recruitment of a wide spectrum of state, corporate and local community actors. photographs were obtained, this was supplemented by regular videos -nine individual online videos were created altogether. Approaches to ethnographic techniques generated knowledge and themes using visual data (photographs), web-based tools and digital video recordings (e.g. vlogs) to represent the researchers' experience and issues relating to MSE infrastructure outcomes (Pink, 2013) . Moreover, the first author undertook and analysed a range of host city materials including official bidding plans, local authority/government and non-governmental organisation (NGO) reports.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Case Study: The 2014 World Cup Host City of Cuiabá
Cuiabá, the capital of Mato Grosso, is situated in the centre-west region of Brazil (Crabb, 2018, see Figure 2 ). During the bid phase, Cuiabá was one of 18 Brazilian cities who bid to host the 2014 World Cup. In a FIFA inspection, Cuiabá was one of 6 cities thought to not have the appropriate infrastructure and therefore could not host the World Cup (FIFA, 2007) . However, in 2009, Cuiabá was announced as a host city, a coup largely achieved through political manoeuvring and use of personal networks of state level elites, some of whom travelled to Switzerland to liaise with FIFA officials (Wilson, 2014) . As a peripheral city, there was a consolidated infrastructure development programme, including a new stadium (Arena Pantanal) to achieve international environmental certification and a new light railway system linking the stadium to key areas within the city. However, these two projects were beset with problems from the start. The initial bid package sent to FIFA was prepared by local architectural firm Castro Mello; they were also contracted by the Mato Grosso government to produce architectural drawings for the new stadium in the preparation phase. These drawings were never produced and before Cuiabá were declared as hosts, mismanagement had cost the tax payer R$500,000 (BRL R$) or £117,361 (Bess, 2013) . Cuiabá were given host city status in 2009, construction started in early 2010 but was temporarily suspended in November 2010 after Mato Grosso state auditors prevented funding from the state government due to irregularities with the budget (Tavares, 2011) . In addition, the preparation phase was also tarnished by the change of seat supplier. The contract to supply the seats was won in July 2013 by a Cuiabá based company, Kango. They were to supply 44,500 seats at a cost of R$19.4 million (£4,553,608). An investigation by the civil prosecution service advised the cancellation of the contract as they found Kango supplied the National Stadium in Brasilia at R$175 (£39.14) each. As a result of this investigation Kango lost the contract to another company, Desk, who quoted the state government R$150 (£35.21) per seat. Due to inconsistencies related to another contract in Sao Paulo, the company were not permitted to hold a contract with a government based enterprise for five years. At this point in 2013, the original company, Kango, had their contract reinstated after they offered their original contract at a 6% discount. A new contract was then drawn up and Kango stated the seats would be installed by 2015 unless a premium was paid (Segalla, 2013) .
Although the event delivery phase was successful, the post-event phase of the cycle has been controversial. Since the 2014 Brazil World Cup, the stadium has been chronically underused, primarily due to construction problems still not being resolved. The stadium was closed in January 2015 due to flooding caused by the wet season. By 2016 the official capacity of the stadium was reduced to 10,000 (Pablo, 2016) . On the 15th July 2016, the Mato Grosso Copyright © Cognizant Communication Corporation 12 MS 19 030 Event Management E-pub government blocked R$28 million (£6,572,219) to the construction company Santa Barbara and Mendes Junior after they had not completed the agreed works (Pablo, 2016) . In 2016, only R$100,000 had been made from events with an average crowd of 766 for the local football team, compared to monthly maintenance costs of R$600,000. In January 2017, a survey was undertaken to assess the main problems of the stadium. Findings of this survey revealed the sound system was not fully-functioning, obvious flooding in the dressing rooms from the wet season and homeless squatters occupying the restaurant areas (Rimoli, 2018) . One resident summarised their feelings "I am so sad when I look at the stadium, it could have been so beautiful, but corruption is everywhere. Welcome to Brazil, welcome to my city" (interview 3).
VLT Infrastructure Programme
The other main infrastructure project, the railway system (VLT), was contentious from the outset of the bid phase (see Figure 3) . When the original bid package was created in 2009, the state government intended to build a railway system in the city. After consultation they revised the plans and developed a bus expressway, costing R$488.8million (£114,732,167) . In 2011, a new state government travelled to Porto, Portugal and after witnessing their train system decided to re-instate the train plans at a cost of R$1.477 billion (£346,684,555). It was thought the VLT would promote Cuiabá as a modern city (Farinha, 2011) . The former governor who endorsed the bus expressway gave his perspective on the change, "it was obvious to everyone the VLT was too expensive, we didn't need it. We needed more buses with more routes. The route of the VLT would not help the congestion in the down town area, that is why we chose the bus expressway" (interview 7). Cuiabá was the smallest 2014 Brazil Football World Cup host city and is suggested to have suffered the most extensive government infrastructure project intervention (Gaffney, 2015) . The preparation phase was beset with problems and this resulted in the train system not 
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Works were still not concluded in the post-event phase. This is a consequence of contractual disputes, and delays in the construction of the VLT system which stopped in December 2014, and to date has yet to restart. In September 2016, the only actor bought to account for the corruption in the construction of the stadium and the VLT was the Governor during that period. Governor Silval Barbosa was responsible for signing off contracts and releasing funds. He was at the centre of a corruption investigation in June 2014 where he was initially arrested but released on bail. As part of the police investigation 'Sodom', Silval was later arrested again in September 2015. This investigation sought to uncover claims that the state government defrauded the federal government by falsely claiming grants. Barbosa is said to have endorsed 34 contracts as Governor of Mato Grosso, including RS1.4 billion (£328,610,953) for the VLT, of which, R$500 million (£117,361,054) was said to be distributed to his colleagues (Ultimo Segundo, 2017).
Case Study: Rio 2016 Olympic Games and Porto Maravilha's Urban Development Programme
Porto Maravilha was deployed through urban regeneration projects to remodel ambitious reforms of the old industrial and historic port (Carvalho, 2016 : Guerra, Ferreira & Kipnis, 2018 . Silvestre, 2016). In preparation for the Olympics, the revitalisation of the port district was designated as one of the main legacies, and a neoliberal experiment to capture the city (Ribeiro & Junior, 2017) . Ancillary infrastructure was also planned, including the Rio Museum of Art (Carvalho, 2016; Sanchez & Essex, 2017) . At first glance, the museum is seen to project the values and practices of sustainability in its engineering and internal exhibitions, blending art and science and enabling visitors to envisage an ecologically sound future (Watts, 2015) . These developments enacted were perceived to be marginal to the 2016 Olympics, but they have become increasingly intertwined with the preparation of the Games (Carvalho, 2016) . Additionally, construction companies and other corporate interests (e.g. office towers, hotels) played a major role in expediting Porto Maravilha's regeneration plans (Ribeiro & Junior, 2017; Silvestre, 2016) . (Watts, 2015) to claims from one interviewee of astronomical levels of R$245 million. On the face of it, a range of hard infrastructure implementations did not satisfactory meet local demand for facilities (Gratton & Preuss, 2008; Li, 2013; Thornley, 2002) . international corporations is a prevalent issue in Porto Maravilha. This is illustrated through the widespread empty and dilapidated corporate offices and towers littering the skyline (see Figure   7 ).
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Ancillary Infrastructure, Facility Development and Urban Spatial Transformation
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Real-time analysis post-Games found that Rio de Janeiro's ex-Olympic event public spaces and dwellings have been designated to stage temporary events. A couple of the interviewees highlighted the central port area acting as a springboard and focal point as public space opportunities start to ripen for commercial event animation (Smith, 2018) 
Urban Transport Network: Targeted Removal or Inclusive Improvements?
A sign of the planning and targeted interventions in Porto Maravilha is the implementation of the light rail vehicle (VLT). The government promise was to add substantial investment in transportation to connect routes stretching in and out of Porto Maravilha. Paes' ideas on the transit reforms were to link the transport networks -metro, buses and airports, particularly the 28km light rail from Gamboa to Central to Santos Dumont terminal (Carvalho, 2016; CDURP, 2016) . Key stations related to this study have been mapped and illustrated in working to a deadline. The seat suppliers were then able to profit at the expense of the taxpayer.
A lack of transparency in the negotiation of contracts has had long term impacts. The final bill for taxpayers in Rio is still unclear as contradictory reports on the costs circulate. In Cuiabá, the difficulties surrounding negotiating contractual agreements meant the VLT was not completed and the governor was imprisoned.
These underlying issues in the preparation phase have led to more widespread ramifications for both host cities. There has been no funding set aside for maintenance of venues and facilities in Rio de Janeiro and there are office building blocks standing empty. In Cuiabá, the VLT still remains unfinished and the stadium is falling into disrepair. These case studies have shown how external actors have been able to influence the development of infrastructure projects. This includes the federal and state governments, sports organising bodies, international corporations, and the local population. Each of these actors has their own agendas and has different abilities to influence outcomes, however, this is not static and can shift as priorities, funding and time scale change. In Table 1 , we have provided a detailed review of the parallels and disparities relating to planning and infrastructure impacts which emerged from the two host city destinations. established what is not known in terms of the physical legacies. For example, the legacy of these infrastructure works attached to the events' bid preparation and delivery, and how this co-existed and operated within the confines of policy and decision-making. In this regard, understanding the production of these legacies across the MSE lifecycle is pivotal. Particularly how they are conceived across multiple locations, coupled with how key stakeholders seize upon the power to influence the eventual manifestation of legacy plans. Hence, MSE bidding and planning has been explored in order to make a judgement on the host cities physical and spatial legacies.
A number of persistent issues have been stressed in relation to the hosting capacity of the city or nation i.e. Brazil. For instance, the role and demands of 'collective elites' (e.g. public authority and local organising committee) in pushing through their local infrastructure agenda. In these examples, primary infrastructure as categorised by Li (2013) Site' public space regeneration (Smith, 2018) , to new or upgraded urban transport systems.
Across the board, host community involvement in the decision-making process was absent.
Applied to the context of the Global South, this examination delves into the critical relationship between MSE planning and urban infrastructure and renewal (Li, 2013) . The cloud of uncertainty surrounding the degree to which infrastructure programmes are seen to be unfinished and often terminated, grounding to halt at the various MSE phases is surely a missed opportunity for Brazil. Instead, hosting cities have become burdened by a political infliction which ignores citizen-led initiatives, in exchange for the pursuit of aesthetically homogenous, built-material city infrastructure.
Drawing upon the notions and distinctions of infrastructure costs and benefits to a host city or nation, this article explored how the evolving corruption saga serves to derail infrastructure projects and threatens the instability of the host city environment. State actors were seen to be engulfed in multiple corruption scandals, which have been identified and discussed in both city settings of Cuiabá and Rio de Janeiro. To limit and address these corruption concerns, MSE planning and bidding procedures must actively deal with issues of transparency. Global and pan-European bodies (e.g. FIFA, UEFA) have started to respond to these challenges posed to host cities. For instance, as part of the reformed 2026 FIFA Football World Cup bidding process, transparency is now listed as a key principle (FIFA, 2017) . Likewise, within the planning and procedures of the 2024 Olympiad, the IOC, has brought to the fore a number of anti-corruption practices to combat fraudulent activity (IOC, 2017) . Changes to regulatory structures could enable hosting cities to amend, retract or veto certain event requirements if the stadiums and venues are thought to be unnecessary and usable. Furthermore, more incentives could be offered This paper made two contributions to the mega sporting event literature. Firstly, it answered calls to further understand the 'Global South' experience of MSE hosting (Maharaj, 2015) . This is particularly important as more developing countries are set to host MSE events in the future. With lower levels of public expenditure than their Global North counterparts, they are more susceptible to corporate sector exploitation. Secondly, we have contributed to the growing focus on pre-event planning as the catalyst for transforming post-event outcomes. Here, it was found that the plethora of actors with different agendas and scope for influence attempt to assert their demands on the bidding and planning stages. This has been visualised in the "HEEPI" Nexus model which was conceptualised earlier on in this paper. Further research directions could be directed toward exploring the relationship between MSE facility developments, the expectations of locals and achieving social outcomes. Longitudinal studies are necessary to tease
